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tax, or whether the doctrine of direct burden and multiple taxation
are two independent conceptions which must be met if a tax is to be
valid. Mr. Justice Stone, in his opinion, states, as heretofore noted,
that the test of previous decisions which had been determined under
the direct burden doctrine is that of multiple taxation, but further on
in his opinion states that an "added reason" for sustaining the tax is
that as a practical matter no other state could tax. Mr. Justice Reed
in the Cloverdale case says that the tax there did not "interfere" with
interstate commerce, and further says that among other factors show-
ing a lack of interference is that the particular tax connot be imposed
by more than, one state. These decisions would seem to indicate that
multiple taxation is merely one of several, perhaps of many, factors
that go to make up an unconstitutional burden on or interference with
interstate commerce and that it is not the decisive test as indicated
in the first part of the Western Live Stock opinion.
Perhaps the most that can be said for the principle announced in the
Western Live Stock case is that in some situations it furnishes an
additional possible ground upon which a.state tax may either be up-
held or invalidated. It does not explain the dichotomy in the existing
cases nor can it be expected to furnish an open sesame for counsel in
future litigation. The comparatively numerous cases of multiple taxa-
tion under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in-
dicate that unconstitutional multiple taxation is not a clear-cut concep-
tion. There is no reason to expect a greater degree of clarity under
the commerce clause.
Mr. Justice Stone recognizes the difficulties in making interstate
commerce pay its way and at the same time not unduly hampering
such commerce and states that "practical rather than logical distinctions
must be sought." That is the very formula which has apparently been
followed under the direct burden doctrine, arid since it means that
each case will be governed by the facts and not abstract propositions,
no unprecedented certainty in this conflicting field of the law is to be
anticipated.
RECENT CASE NOTES
TRADE-MARKS--TERRrrORIAL EXTENT OF TRADE-MARK RIGTs-Appellant,
in 1915, adopted "Bond" as its trade-mark for bread and bakery products.
Appellee, in 1931, started operating department stores in and around Chicago,
using the trade-mark "Goldblatt's Bond" on razor blades, shaving cream, and
cigars, and thereafter extended its use to some 300 items sold by its stores,
including bread. Appellant uses its trade-mark within a radius of 50 miles
of St. Louis, and within a radius of 50 to 75 miles of Indianapolis. Appellee
has a market within a radius of 50 miles of Chicago. Suit for an injunction;
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HELD, the injunction should be refused, that the trade-marks were not con-
fusingly similar, that trade-marks will be protected only when used in con-
nection with business, and that trade-marks have limitations coincident with
limitations of the trade which it is presumed to protect.'
The general rule is that as between two conflicting claimants of the right
to use the same mark, priority of appropriation determines the question, and
the first appropriator of that mark has the right to its exclusive use.2  How-
ever, an exception to this rule was promulgated by the two cases of Hanover
Star Milling Co. v'. Metcalf,8 and United Drug Co. vu. Theodore Rectanus
Co.,4 in which two cases the first user was denied relief. How far this
exception goes is at present a troublesome question. This exception, which
has almost become a rule in itself instead of an exception, is that while the
first appropriator and user of a trade-mark owns such mark and is entitled
to protection by the courts in the use thereof against subsequent users on the
same class of goods, such protection will not be afforded as against a subse-
quent user and appropriator who in good faith adopts and uses the mark
in territory into which the goods of the first appropriator have not pene-
trated and have not been used or sold. Some courts in quoting from these
cases have held that this rule denies a right of expansion, 5 while others have
refused to so interpret them. Regardless of what these cases actually hold,O
1 General Baking Co. v. Goldblatt Bros., Inc., (1937), 90 F. (2d) 241.
2 Columbia Mill Co. v. Alcorn (1893), 150 U.S. 460, 14 S. Ct. 151; Bayuk
Cigars, Inc. v. Schwartz (1932), 1 F. Supp. 283; Tillman & Bendel, Inc. v.
California Packing Corp. (1933), 63 F. (2d) 498.8 Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf (1916), 240 U.S. 403, 36 S. Ct. 357.
"Tea Rose" was used by the Plaintiff, an Ohio concern established in 1872,
for its trade-mark, and was also used by defendant, an Illinois resident, who
first used it in 1885. The Illinois concern had been selling flour in Alabama
and the southeastern part of the United States for about twelve years, when
plaintiff decided to sell in Alabama, and finding defendant there, brought
action, as first appropriator of the mark, to enjoin him from further use.
The injunction was denied.
4 United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co. (1918), 248 U.S. 90, 39
S. Ct. 48. Plaintiff first used the trade-mark "Rex" in Massachusetts in 1877.
In 1883, defendant began to use the same trade-mark in Louisville, Kentucky.
In 1911, plaintiff extended its sales- to Kentucky, and brought suit for an
injunction, which was denied.
5 Examples of the cases on this point are numerous; cases which cite those
cases with approval and seemingly follow the rule are: Carigan v. Plibrico
Jointless Firebrick Co. (1933), 65 F. (2d) 849; May v. Goodyear Tire and
Rubber Co. (1935), 10 F. Supp. 249; Ammon & Person v. Narragansett
Dairy Co. (1919), 262 F. 880; Vermont Maple Syrup Co. v. Johnson Maple
Syrup Co. (1921), 272 F. 478. Silver Swan Liquor Corp. v. Hiram Walker
(1937), 19 F. Supp. 445, is a recent and peculiar case. The court held that
the plaintiff had established their prior appropriation and right to use in cer-
tain of the Western States, and that defendant had established its right to a
prior appropriation and use in the remainder of the United States. The
court does not cite authority, but it would seem that it was deciding the case
on basis of priority as to territory rather than priority as to trade-mark.
6 In Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, supra Note 3, the language
of the court in denying the right of expansion is as follows: "That the
property in a trade-mark is not limited in its enjoyment by territorial bounds,
but may be asserted and protected wherever the law affords a remedy for
wrongs, is true in a limited sense. Into whatever markets the use of a
trade-mark has extended, or its meaning has become known, there will be
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they have resulted in confusion, and are being used to build a general rule
regarding the geographic extent of trade-marks. They were designated by the
Supreme Court as unusual cases, but they are being applied in cases involv-
ing no unusual circumstances and to deny a first user the right of natural
expansion. They have also been cited in support of decisions to the effect that
a trade-mark may be used by a different concern on goods not of the same
description or class as the goods of the first user,7 although the factual set-up
is usually quite different from that found in the Hanover and Rectanus cases.
Some courts that have taken the Hanover and Rectanus cases as the
rule instead of the exception, make exceptions to that rule. These exceptions
are well stated in 8weet Sixteen Co. v. S'weet "16" Shop.8 This case quotes
the Rectanus case as setting up the first exception, saying that the question
of prior appropriation is legally insignificant "unless at least it appear that
the second adopter has selected the mark with some design inimical to the
interest of the first user, such as to take the benefit of the reputation of his
the manufacturer or trader whose trade is pirated by an infringing use be
entitled to protection or redress. But this is not to say that the appropriator
of a trade-mark, good in the markets where it has been employed, can
monopolize markets that his trade has never reached, and where the mark
signifies not his goods, but those of another." Also, "We agree with the
court below that 'Since it is the trade, and not the mark, that is to be protected,
a trade-mark acknowledges no territorial boundaries of municipalities or
states or nations, but extends to every market where the trader's goods have
become known and identified by his use of the mark. But the mark of itself
cannot travel to markets where there is no article to wear the badge and
no trader to offer the article.'"
The language of United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., supra Note
4, is found in the following; "It results that the adoption of a trade-mark
does not . . . project the right of protection in advance of the extension
of trade, or operate as a claim of territorial rights over areas into which
it thereafter may be deemed desirable to extend the trade. . . . The
asserted doctrine is based on the fundamental error of supposing that a
trade-mark right is a right in gross or at large, like a statutory copyright or
a patent for an invention, to either of which, in truth, it has little or no
analogy. There is no such thing as property in a trade-mark- except as a
right appurtenant to an established business or trade in connection with which
the mark is employed. The law of Trade-marks is but a part of the broader
law of unfair competition; the right to a particular mark grows out of its use,
not its mere adoption; its function is simply to designate the goods as the
product of a particular trader and to protect his good will against the sale
of another's product as his; and it is not the subject of property except in
connection with an existing business." There are so many statements like
those quoted above that a true understanding of these two cases can be best
had by a reading and a consideration of them as a whole.
7Treager v. Gordon Allen Ltd. (1934), 71 F. (2d) 766; Aladdin Mfg.
Co. v. Mantle Lamp Co. (1934), 9 F. Supp. 930; Beech-Nut Packing Co.
v. P. Lorillard Co. (1924), 299 F. 834; American Steel Foundries v. Robert-
son, Commissioner (1926), 269 U.S. 372, 46 S. Ct. 160.
8 Sweet Sixteen Co. v. Sweet "16" Shop (1926), 15 F. (2d) 920. Plaintiff's
business, beginning in 1916 with one woman's shop in San Francisco, within
5 years included 5 stores on the Pacific Coast, a New York purchasing agency,
and a mail order business covering many states, including Utah. It had
widely advertised its product and its name. Before it could carry out plans
to open a store in Salt Lake City, defendant started a similar business there
under the name "Sweet 16 Shop." An injunction was granted the plaintiff,
the first appropriator of the mark.
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goods, to forestall the extension of his trade, or the like." It quotes the Han-
over case for the second exception: "We are not dealing with a case where
the junior appropriator of a trade-mark is occupying territory that would
probably be reached by the prior user in the natural expansion of trade,
and need not pass upon such a case." Although the case would thus seem to
recognize the right of natural expansion, the decision of the court allowing
an injunction to the first user is based on the exception of bad faith. It
would seem on a close reading of the Hanover and Rectanus cases that the
emphasis was placed on the innocence and good faith of the second user, and
that in the Sweet Sixteen case it would have been correct to say the general
rule of first appropriation applied, rather than saying that the exceptions
to the rule of those cases apply. Buckspan u. Hudson's Bay Co.9 distinguishes
the Hanover and Rectanus cases on the basis of good faith, much the same
way as in the Sweet Sixteen case, and also gave injunctive relief to the
first appropriator.1 0
There are other cases that would seem to recognize the right of expan-
sion. Hub Clothing Co. v. Cohen1 l holds that the Hanover case does not
apply to prevent the plaintiff from protecting his name from imitation in a
town nine miles away where plaintiff had arranged to start but had not yet
started a branch. The case would seem strong because of the extremely local
nature of the business. In Western Oil Co. v. Jones,12 the court recognized
the right to normal expansion of business by saying of the Hanover and
Rectanus cases, "Those limitations, in our opinion, do not exclude territory
which may be reasonably expected to be within the normal expansions of
business." However, much of the force of the case is lost because there was
a conscious infringement, and the plaintiff had been using state wide ad-
vertising. The court took the position of protecting both plaintiff's established
business and plaintiff's prospective business in Terminal Barber Shops 'V.
Zoberg.13 Relief was granted in that case, the court following the exception
9 Buckspan v. Hudson's Bay Co. (1927), 22 F. (2d) 721.
10 See, also, The Governor and Company of Adventurers of England
Trading into Hudson's Bay v. Hudson Bay Fur Co. (1928), 33 F. (2d) 801.
in which the court said, "The outstanding feature of such cases [speaking of
the Hanover and Rectanus cases] is that the second person or trading firm
to adopt the name or device was in entire ignorance that the same name
or devise had previously been adopted by another in the same business, and
the second acted innocently and in good faith", and then held that the case
under consideration was simply in a different class.
11Hub Clothing Co. v. Cohen (1921), 270 Pa. 487, 113 A. 677. Plaintiff
had a clothing business in Wilkes Barre, Pa., under the name of "The
Hub," beginning business in 1909. In 1920, plaintiff arranged for a branch
store in Pittston, nine miles fiom Wilkes Barre. At the same time, defendant,
who had done business under the name "Cohen Bros.," started an advertising
campaign under the name "The Hub." Plaintiff was granted an injunction.
12 Western Oil Co. v. Jones (1928), 27 F. (2d) 205. Plaintiff, since 1917,
had used the name "Silver Flash" for its gasoline. In 1923, defendant started
using "Silver Flash" and on notice from plaintiff changed to "Super Flash."
Believing this to be an infringement also, plaintiff asked for an injunction.
Defendant pleaded the plaintiff did not sell within his territory. An injunction
was given covering the whole state of Ohio, the court stating that it made
no difference that appellants had not sold gasoline in the two towns where
defendant operated, because appellant's name was so widely spread.
13Terminal Barber Shops v. Zoberg (1928), 28 F. (2d) 807. Plaintiff
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to the Hanover rule, and saying that where a subsequent user tries to take
the benefit of Plaintiff's reputation, "or to forestall the extension of its trade,"
he commits an injury which the courts will take steps to bring to an end.
As the law stands, trade-mark users are in a dilemma. They must either,
immediately upon opening business, ship their goods to all markets where
they may want to expand in the future, or later risk having to give up
territory because someone else has established himself there using the same
trade-mark. At the same time, the innocent second appropriator must be
protected. Possibly the only way to reach a satisfactory result is to require
the registration of all trade-marks before they have any validity, so that
it can be ascertained whether a mark is being used before time and expense
have been expended in acquiring a market and promoting good will.
The question of whether the right of a business to expand will be pro-
tected in the future, and the rights of a subsequent user limited to agree
with the sort of factual set-up found in the Hanover and Rectanus cases,
will probably remain confused and unsettled until the Supreme Court of
the United States hands down a decision on the matter. Until that time,
it will be almost impossible to forecast what the result of any one suit will
be. In the noted case, the decision would seem to be correct, even though
the court does not give any weight to possible expansion in the future. The
fact that appellant has expanded but little during its 20 years of life would
or might be one element to consider in what might be termed its "natural
expansion". At the same time, the fact that appellee has worked up a large
trade at considerable expense for over seven years might bring it within
the scope of the Hanover and Rectanus cases, and would be sufficient cause
for denying appellant relief.1 4  P. K. R.
SALES-LIABILrrY OF A MANUFACTURER FOR MISREPRESENTATIONS TO SUE-
PURCHASEsR.-Plaintiff purchased from a retail dealer an automobile, repre-
sented by the manufacturer and dealer by advertisements to be equipped with
a safety windshield. Because of the shattering of the windshield when the
plaintiff had a collision, particles of glass cut him, injuring him severely. This
action was brought against the manufacturer. Held, (1) no cause of action
exists in warranty without privity; and (2) knowledge of falsity of representa-
tion is necessary for liability for misrepresentation. 1
The law of warranty is older by a century than special assumpsit. In
fact the action upon the case on a warranty was one of the bases upon which
the law of assumpsit seems to have been built.2 The first reported case of
operated barber shops in New York City from 1908, and at the time of suit
had 31 shops and expended $75,000 yearly in advertising. Defendant opened
five shops in New York and New Jersey, applying the name "Terminal" to
them, with a resulting confusion to the public. Plaintiff was granted an
injunction covering not only New York where his shops were located, but also
New Jersey.
14There can be no doubt of the cases noted, because of the finding that
the trade-mark of appellant and that of appellee were not confusingly similar.
The question as to the geographic extent to which trade-marks would be
protected could be controlling only where there was a confusing similarity.
1 Chanin v. Chevrolet Motor Co. (C. C. A., seventh circuit), 89 F. (2d) 889.
2 Williston, Sales (2d), Sec. 195.
